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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
pardon of a prior offense would not serve to destroy the historical
effect of the conviction thereof.
In State ex rel. Coole v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 619, 629, 58 S.E.2d
784, 790 (1950), it was said: "It will not do to say, nor do any ot
the authorities say, that the granting of a pardon wipes out the
conviction and renders the party innocent dating back to the time
he was convicted .... Neither the Governor of this State, nor the
Court of Claims, nor the Legislature, has any constitutional power
to pass upon the guilt or innocence of a person charged with a
crime. That power rests, under our Constitution, in the judicial
department of the State government."
Executive clemency, while being a constitutional power, not
subject to legislative control, is however, subject to legislative regu-
lation which prescribes that a second conviction, without excepting
pardon or parole from the first, shall incur the penalty prescribed
in the habitual criminal statute. State v. Fisher, supra.
In making the decision in the instant case, our court goes
along with the weight of authority. See People ex rel. Prisament
v. Brophy, 317 U.S. 625 (1942). The minority view is based upon
the theory that an unconditional pardon serves to wipe out all
the effects of the prior conviction and makes the offender a "new
man", just as though he had never committed the crime. State
v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So.2d 189 (1941). The instant case
discredits such a position by pointing out that the criminal charac-
ter or habits of the individual, the chief postulate of habitual
criminal statutes, is often as clearly disclosed by a pardoned con-
viction as by one never condoned.
E. W. K.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTION INCOMPLETE AS TO FAc.-On
trial for murder, D relied on self-defense. He was being treated in
a hostile and threatening manner by two persons acting in concert,
which led to the fatal shooting of one of them. D was convicted
of second degree murder. One point of error assigned in the
appellate court was the giving of an instruction which stated his
right of self-defense against the deceased only, omitting any mention
of the fact that there were two parties acting hostilely toward him.
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He contended that the instruction should have told the jury that
if he was threatened by either or both of these persons, he had the
right of self-defense against either or both of them. However,
this omitted factual situation was fully set out in another instruc-
tion. Held, that the instruction was merely incomplete, and the
incompleteness was remedied by the other instruction. State v.
Harlow, 71 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1952) (8-1 decision).
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction, as well as in most
others, that a nonbinding instruction merely incomplete (as con-
trasted with inconsistent or erroneous instructions) will be aided
by another instruction which supplies the missing element, and that
instructions are to be read and construed as a whole.
The first West Virginia case found so holding is State v Prater,
52 W. Va. 132, 43 S.E. 230 (1902). There an instruction did not
state that the jury could acquit the defendant. However, another
instruction told the jury that they should find the defendant not
guilty unless they believed him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court held that the incompleteness in the former instruction
was cured by the latter.
There are many other cases in this jurisdiction which follow
the rule. However, all the earlier cases seemingly differ from the
instant case [and State v. DeBoard, 119 W. Va. 396, 196 S.E. 349
(1937)], in that the instructions held incomplete in the earlier
cases appear to contain incomplete statements of the law applicable
to the facts in dispute rather than incomplete statements of the
undisputed facts. State v. Cottrill, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S.E. 244 (1902)
(omitted that self-defense can be shown by state's evidence); State
v. Dodds, 54 W. Va. 289, 46 S.E. 228 (1903) (stated presumption of
guilt of murder, but failed to show how presumption of guilt of
murder could be rebutted); Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co.,
57 W .Va. 132, 49 S.E. 1030 (1905) (omitted law as to contributory
negligence); State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1, 52 S.E. 981 (1906)
(neglected to say that to bring in a verdict, the jury must believe
the defendant guilty of the offense named in the verdict); Connolly
v. Bollinger, 67 W. Va. 30, 67 S.E. 71 (1910) (failed to define the
term, "valid marriage contract"); Powell Music Co. v. Parkersburg
Trans. & Stor. Co, 75 W. Va. 659, 84 S.E. 563 (1915) (neglected to
say that defendant would be liable only if he failed to exercise
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reasonable care); State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S.E. 981 (1918)
(failed to distingiish between two degrees of statutory murder).
The rule was extended in State v. DeBoard, supra. There the
defendant was being menaced by several individuals. One instruc-
tion given indicated that there was but one person (the deceased)
molesting the defendant, and stated the defendant's right of self-
defense against him alone. The instruction was held curable. The
court settled this and the instant case by the same rule as applied
in the earlier cases, without distinguishing them, so that it now
seems well established that the incomplete instruction rule has
been extended to include instructions incomplete as to fact.
The policy behind holding an incomplete instruction curable
is that the jury cannot be misled by such an instruction because it
does not actually misstate anything, but merely has an omission
which is supplemented by another instruction. In extending the
rule to factually incomplete instructions, it would seem that the
distinction should have been recognized and that the policy on
which the rule is based should have been considered.
R. A. K.
DIVORCE-CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT AS GROUND FOR.-
Proceeding by wife against husband for separate maintenance on
ground of cruel or inhuman treatment under W. VA. CODE c. 48,
art. 2, § 4 (Michie 1949). They were married in 1944. He began
to treat her with coldness and indifference almost immediately. He
refused to converse with her, failed or refused to come to meals and
many times used profane language toward her. He refused to visit
her while she was being treated at a hospital. H's demurrer was
overruled and the trial chancellor granted the decree. H appealed.
Held, that the conduct of the husband did not constitute cruel or
inhuman treatment. Decree reversed; cause dismissed. Davis v.
Davis, 70 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1952).
It should be noted that -the decision in the above case does not
expound new law in West Virginia. The law on this subject seems
to be well settled and has been so since the case of Goff v. Goff, 60
W. Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1907). The purpose of this comment then
is not to bring new law before the bar, but merely to point out and
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